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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The title of Douglas Walton and Thomas F. Gordon’s paper points to the widespread 
research direction in the contemporary argumentation theory, which is to bridge 
the gap between the formal and the informal approach to arguments. The 
expression “formalizing informal logic” seems to be pretty obvious for the number 
of researchers who deal with formal and computational models of argument, within 
which a formalization of everyday argumentation constitutes the crucial area of 
inquiry. However, some formal logicians who accept the purely deductive approach 
to logic may still treat this expression as a paradox. 
Walton and Gordon’s project stems from the discussion on the relationship 
between formal and informal logic which took place at the very beginning of the 
Informal Logic Initiative which originated in the early 1970s (Johnson, 1996). 
Within the last decade the development of many software tools motivated 
researchers to put the projects of formalizing informal logic into the frameworks of 
the computational models of argument that were provided by computer science 
(and AI). The project is clearly in line with this trend, since it is carried out by means 
of the Carneades Argumentation System. Because of the fact that Carneades is still 
being developed, what may cause some differences among definitions and solutions 
included in a variety of papers devoted to it, we will focus on the description 
presented in the commented article. 
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2. THE PROGRAM OF FORMALIZING INFORMAL LOGIC 
 
Walton and Gordon’s approach has a number of advantages, amongst which we 
should mention the following: 
 
(i)  The capability of grasping all important “requirements something has to 
meet to be an informal logic” (p. 1). The paper is a pronounced manifesto of 
formalizing informal logic around ten pillars (pp. 1-2). The list is a clear illustration 
of the fact that the Authors do not focus on formalizing just some selected aspects of 
argumentation, but their goal is much more ambitious: they show the legitimacy of 
building a full formal theory of argument. In this respect, the above characteristics 
may serve as a coherent and systematic methodological framework for formal 
theories of “real” argument. 
 
(ii)  The proposed model is in line with the claim that the formal and the 
pragmatic accounts to arguments are complementary, and not competing. It takes 
into account the pragmatic features of arguments, which were discussed from the 
very beginning of the Informal Logic Initiative. Following Johnson’s suggestion to 
capture arguments which occur in the real-life context, it conceives argumentation 
as a teleological process (p. 1, cf. Johnson, 1996, p. 106). With regard to this crucial 
postulate of informal logic we may observe that Walton and Gordon’s program takes 
into account not only the description of the structure of arguments, but also their 
goal-driven character.  Amongst the goals of argumentation which are included into 
the proposed model there are: making arguments relevant and sufficient and 
making the claim acceptable. Thus, the inclusion of the RSA (relevance – sufficiency 
– acceptability) triangle underlines, amongst other features, the teleological nature 
of argumentation. 
 
(iii)  The Carneades software allows us also to include the social context in the 
computational model of argument. Hence, the third advantage of the proposed 
approach may be seen in the fact that the Authors aim at proposing the ambitious 
task of giving possibly broad characteristic of the social argumentative procedures. 
Thus, we observe that the authors aim at taking into account not only inferential, but 
also dialectical and rhetorical aspects of argumentation. The dialectical approach 
may be seen in including arguments pro and con, and the rhetorical – in modeling 
possible reactions of an audience. 
 
Stressing the advantage to introduce the audience to the model, we would 
like to propose a slight modification of this notion. Audiences are defined as tuples 
<assumptions, weights> (p. 2). In our opinion, they may be also linked with the proof 
standards as socially determined paradigms of argument evaluation. Thus, besides 
assumptions and weights, the third element could be added to audiences, namely a 
function assigning proof standards to statements of the considered language. 
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3. CARNEADES AS A FOUNDATION FOR THE RESEARCH PROGRAM 
 
3.1. Argument graphs 
 
The proposed definition of the argument graph (p. 2) aims at grasping a number of 
key features of arguments. This task is commendable, but it results in a very 
complex argument representation. The possible objection is that the proposed 
structure departs from the everyday, intuitive understanding of argumentation, 
according to which conclusions and premises seem to be the nodes rather, and 
arguments — relations between them, i.e. the edges. This order is reversed in 
Carneades. The fact that premises and conclusions are the edges of the graph may 
be seen as particularly surprising. It may be technically justified by the software 
application, but from the methodological point of view the question arises whether 
it is possible to propose a more simple model of argument representation, which 
will not lose the crucial structural features of argumentation that are encoded in 
argument graphs.  A proposition is to simply sum up triples of the form <P, c, d>, 
where P is a finite set of premises, c is a conclusion, and d is a Boolean value 
representing the direction of the premises (it is true if they are pro, and false if they 
are con). Within a parallel attempt to formalize informal logic (Selinger, 20xx) sets 
of ordered pairs of the form <P, c> (i.e. without exceptions) are considered as 
argumentative structures. Thus an argument is simply a relation between sets of 
statements and single statements (and Boolean values if also exceptions are to be 
taken into account). 
Otherwise than the definition of an argument present in (Gordon & Walton, 
2006, def. 3), the definition of an argument node formulated in this paper (p. 2) 
seems to be insufficient: “Each argument node in 𝐴 is a structure ⟨𝑠, d⟩”, where both 
parameters are Boolean values. It follows that there are actually only four different 
argument nodes, namely: <true, true>; <true, false>; <false, true> and <false, false>. 
Figure 3 (p. 5) can serve as an example. Both circles seem to denote the same 
argument node, which is supposed to be the pair <false, true>, since both 
convergent components are defeasible and pro. Thus, in fact, the premises happen to 
be linked.  
 
3.2. Conductive arguments 
 
The Authors define conductive arguments as pro-contra arguments (p. 8). They 
make it possible to capture the dialectical aspect of argumentation in a single 
diagram, what is an undoubted benefit. 
From a purely dialectical point of view, however, arguments in a dialogue are 
in game. They are attacked and defended by the proponent and the opponent in a 
dialogue. The order of moves in this game can affect the final result (as in some 
juridical procedures). Thus, conductive arguments reflect rather this result, but not 
the course and structure of the game. This restriction is not valid if there is no game 
involved as for example in an individual decision process of some rational being, 
who has to consider the pros and cons, and who can simply sum up them in the end. 
Such a process, however, is only, so to say, quasi-dialectical, so that one can say that 
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conductive arguments introduce as much of dialectics to argumentative structures 
as can be adopted by an essentially logical approach. 
At this point a question arises: how some more complex decision processes 
can be modeled in the Carneades system? We mean particularly the situation in 
which we have to accept exactly one of some (more than two) exclusive 
propositions. For example, we are to choose a place to spend holidays. Thus we have 
many propositions:  “It would be the best to go to A”, “It would be the best to go to 
B”, “It would be the best to go to C”, etc., and hence many conductive arguments for 
each of them. Can Carneades warrantee that exactly one (or at most one) of them 
will be evaluated as acceptable? (If we have only pro arguments, the preponderance 
of the evidence standard can be obviously applied). 
 
3.3. Premise acceptability 
 
Carneades, in the form presented in the article, does not allow for precise modeling 
arguments with premises which are not fully acceptable. Such uncertain and merely 
probable premises often occur in everyday argumentation (as regards, for example, 
the criticism or skepticism of the audience), and doubts about them affect the 
acceptability of their conclusions. In agreement with the characteristic given by the 
Authors, “informal logic is concerned with analyzing real arguments” (p. 1). 
Carneades, however, tells the audience to evaluate premises (as well as conclusions, 
consequently) using only three values: in, out, undecided. It follows that if a dubious 
premise is classified as in, any doubt of the audience will be actually ignored, i.e. it 
will not affect the acceptability of the conclusion. The argument will be 
overestimated in this case. Otherwise, if a dubious premise is considered as 
undecided, it will entirely block further reasoning, and the argument will be 
underestimated.  
The considered simplification allows us to avoid an effect of, so to say, 
“doubts accumulation” concerning the premises of linked arguments. By analogy to 
probability, it seems reasonable to assume that the whole set of uncertain but to 
some degree acceptable  (independent) statements can be not acceptable itself and 
thus undercut the conclusion (the acceptability of a set of statements can be 
identified intuitively with the acceptability of their conjunction). But in Carneades, if 
all uncertain premises would be considered as in, then (assuming the argument 
node is in) the conclusion will be in, too. In summary, one of the RSA triangle 
postulate (as adopted by Carneades), which requires that the premises should be 
only individually acceptable (p. 6), is not enough restrictive with respect to the 
domain of linked arguments with uncertain premises. 
 
3.4. Argument weights 
 
The Authors recommend real numbers in the range <0.0...1.0> to represent relative 
weights of arguments (p. 3). However, they do not explain the intuitive meaning of 
these degrees.  
Despite of offering a fairly large number of weight values, Carneades does not 
allow us to find out weights of convergent arguments. But it is just summing the 
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weights of such arguments and, in this way, strengthening the acceptability of their 
conclusion that seems to be the reason to use this kind of reasoning, when a 
definitive proof is not at hand. But the Authors warn us against summing the 
weights of convergent arguments due to some possible dependence between them 
that can result in the double counting fallacy (p. 10). This difficulty is very hard to 
overcome; however, the question of the relationship between the converging 
arguments can probably be slightly simplified by reducing it to the question of the 
relationship between the conjunctions of their premises. It is also noteworthy that 
an algorithm for summing the weights of independent arguments (Yanal, 1988; 
Selinger, 20xx) can be still useful, even in this troublesome case, since it defines an 
upper bound for the sum of the weights of arguments which are dependent. 
Instead of dealing with the issue of summing the argument weights, 
Carneades offers us proof standards to find out if the conclusion of the whole 
argument is in, out or undecided. However, in convergent arguments (without 
exceptions), once the conclusion is in, it will remain the same, regardless of how 
many convergent components will be added. Thus, the final result does not contain 
an information about the weight of the whole argumentation, which can be useful 
for instance to compare the effectiveness of different convergent combinations of 
arguments. Using the “preponderance of the evidence” proof standard we can only 
choose the component with the greatest weight. The rest of them cannot affect the 
final result of evaluation, so that they are in fact useless. It follows that they may 
play their role only with respect to some con arguments (and not on the basis of the 
preponderance of the evidence). To sum up, it seems that the cumulative nature of 
convergent reasoning is not reflected by Carneades with respect to the arguments 
without exceptions (or only with exceptions). 
 
3.5. Proof standards 
 
Obviously, also the evaluation of conductive arguments can be affected by possible 
dependences among their components. Thus, for example, two weak but dependent 
and double counted pro arguments could unfairly prevail a stronger con one. The 
proof standards that map the weights of those components into the set of Boolean 
values are a kind of a specific insurance against this effect. What we do lose by 
applying these standards is at first sight the precise information how much the pros 
prevail the cons (or vice versa). If the proof standards can be linearly ordered with 
respect to their restrictiveness, then a certain scale would be available. Actually, the 
Authors point to some of them as the ones that are higher than the others (pp. 7-8), 
but the principle by which one could obtain a complete hierarchy of all of the proof 
standards is not specified, and therefore it should be precisely defined. If we even 
give the satisfactory definition, we will still have a rather limited scale, while we 
dispose the real numbers in the range <0.0…1.0>. Thus, in order to fully exploit 
them, i.e. to map the weights of the components of conductive arguments into the 
set <0.0…1.0>, some more precise numerical technics must be developed, and the 
problem of the arguments dependency must be faced.                   
Actually, such precise information about the argument value, which is to be 
eventually expressed by the degree of acceptability of the conclusion, may be not 
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always needed. Decision-making can be a good example. Let us imagine that we 
wonder whether to cross a river. Once we make up a decision, say, on the basis of an 
argumentation which is acceptable with the degree of 75%, we have to accomplish 
our task entirely. So to say, we have to cross the whole river, not as e.g. one could 
calculate, a half of it. The sentence in a criminal court action can be only: guilty (in) 
or not guilty (out). Some legal systems allow it to be undecided too, but not — 75% 
or 79% guilty. It is fully justified regarding the decision on penalty (especially the 
death penalty). On the other hand, the amount of penalty in the case of 
imprisonment could be considered as relativized to this parameter, say, 
proportionally. This proposal is very controversial, but there are some other 
domains in which precise, numerical information about the degree of argument 
acceptability seems to be clearly desired. Our remark concerns in particular the 
scientific research, within which the methodological criticism requires to have as 
precise and accurate information about reasoning as possible. So we should neither 
neglect nor a fortiori resign from the studies on the independence of arguments and 
on evaluation of convergent and conductive arguments in the probabilistic scale. 
Apart from this purely theoretical interest, such precise information might simply 
be useful on some occasions as forecasting of atmospheric phenomena, risk 
assessment etc. 
The absence of a uniform standard for evaluation of pro against con 
arguments motivates us to raise one more question, namely the question of the 
rules for assigning proof standards to the statements that are considered as the 
conclusions of evaluated arguments. An unconstrained possibility to change the 
proof standards by simply clicking the menu bar seems to be too liberal solution. So, 
our question can be also formulated as follows: which proof standard should be 
used to evaluate arguments concerning the choice of a proof standard? 
Yet, let us note that the applicability of the proof standards can be impeded 
by the (suggested by us) introduction of not fully acceptable premises. Pro and con 
arguments with relatively low weights, but with absolutely certain premises, could 
be stronger than those that have high weights, but their premises are uncertain.  
Thus in order to evaluate such pros and cons an algorithm reducing their weights 
with respect to the acceptability of premises is needed (cf. Selinger, 20xx). 
 
4. CONCLUSION 
 
Since the Carneades system has been already described and discussed on many 
occasions, the crucial value of the commented paper, in our opinion, is not to 
present the system itself, but to formulate a list of requirements that any informal 
logic approach has to meet.  We propose to specify this list by introducing two slight 
but important modifications to this characteristic. Namely, we think that informal 
logic has to recognize the degrees of acceptability of argument premises, and 
moreover, it has to analyse the problem of dependent arguments, and distinguish 
the degrees of acceptability of arguments conclusions whenever it is possible.  
We consider the Carneades system as a fairly solid fundament for the 
formalized construction of informal logic. This belief, however, is not devoid of any 
criticism. Our most general, critical remark concerning Carneades as a framework 
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for informal logic is that it complicates the structure of argument, on one hand, 
while it simplifies the evaluation, on the other.  
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